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Changing Responsibilities for Meeting
Financial Requirements
If the apportionment of functions among the various levels of govern-
ment were clear-cut and stable, one might safely consider the financial
requirements of each level without regard to the requirements of the
others. But both functions and the responsibilities for financing them
overlap, and the apportionment of both functions and responsibilities has
been gradually changing. Also, of course, an over-all expansion in govern-
ment functions has been taking place.
There have been two main types of change in the responsibilities for
meeting financial requirements, those resulting from changes in the
apportionment of substantive functions and those in which one unit of
government simply assumes part of the burden of financing a function
performed by another. We will refer to them respectively as changes in
substantive and changes in fiscal functions.
The substantive function changes we will be concerned with in this
chapter arc mostly on the state and local levels. But we will encounter
two kinds of functions responsible for extensive state and local borrowing
in the nineteenth century that have substantially ceased to involve state
or local financial requirements. Although maintenance of the National
Guard Continues to be a state function, state borrowing to finance the
raising and equipping of an army came to an end with the Spanish-
American War.' And state and local governments have come to leave the
functions of extending credit to private parties and guaranteeing private
credit almost entirely to the federal government.
In connection with the substantive changes in state and local govern-
ment functions we will have occasion to examine the restrictions that have
developed on state and local financing.
Formerly poor relief was considered to be primarily a local community
responsibility. In considering here the changes in fiscal functions brought
about by federal grants-in-aid we will note the development of grants for
general (i.e. unemployment) relief and special public assistance programs.
But more detailed attention will be given to the change in responsibility
for financing general relief in Chapter VI.
'Two states borrowed to help finance their parts in this brief war. See the Census of
Debt and Taxation for 1902, pp. 161 and 169.
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1. Substantive Functional Changes and Restrictions
on Financing
Table 24 sketches the growth.of state and local debts since 1839. One
may infer from the incompleteness of the record that local debts were
relatively unimportant before 1850. And state debts were small during
the early years of the nineteenth century. After the formation of the Union,
Revolutionary War debts had been assumed by the new federal govern-
ment, and the federal government reimbursed the states for deficits
incurred during the War of 1812.2 But New York State borrowed to
finance the Erie Canal during the 1 820's and the success of this canal
encouraged an era of extensive state financing. We have information about
state debts in 1839, because of the great volume of new issues in 1835—38—
over $100 million—and because of the financial difficulties following the
crisis of 1837'. The totals of state indebtedness in 1839 and 1841 compare
with gross federal debt of $10 million in the former year and $5 million
in the latter. From 1819 until the Civil War the federal debt was less
than $100 million.
Table 2A indicates that the main purposes of state borrowing in the
1830's were aid to banks, building canals, and aid to railroads. Although
all three of these purposes can well be regarded as public in nature, it is
clear that government borrowing was extensively used to finance privately
owned enterprises. And if a major objective in such financing was en-
couraging the process of industrialization, this objective seems to have
been combined with that of accumulating a portfolio of income-yielding
investments.3 However, the great increase in debts left several states in a
definitely unsound financial condition after the 1837 crisis. Eight states
defaulted and three of them repudiated bond issues.4 The situation was
complicated "by the fact that foreigners had invested liberally in the
securities which were now disowned"5 or in default or even merely selling
at a substantial discount.
One result of the post-1837 financial difficulties was unsuccessful
agitation, 1842—43, to have the federal government again assume state
debts. A second result, which will be considered shortly, was the adoption
by a number of states of constitutional restrictions on their financing.
Between 1842 and 1857, nineteen states adopted such restrictions.6
2B.U. Ratchford, American State Debts, p. 74. New York was the principal borrower
in 1800—1820 and was apparently the first state to make extensive use of the bond type
of credit instrument in its financing.
Cf. Ratchford, op.cit., p. 78.
Including Florida, then a territory. Paul Studenski and Herman E. Krooss, Financial
History of the United States, p. 118.
Davis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States, p. 244.
H. Secrist, An Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Restrictions Upon Public Indebtedness
in the United States, Appendix II.
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TABLE 24





(1) (2) (3) (4)
GROSS DEBTSLESS SINKING FUND ASSETS
1839 164 a a a
1841 190 a a a
1843 a a 27.5b a
1853 193 a a a
1860 257 a a a
1870 353 188 328 869
1880 275 124 724c 1,123
1890 211 145 781c 1,137
1902 235 197 1,433c 1,865
GROSS DEBTS
1902 270 205 1,720 2,195
1913 423 393 3,682 4,498
1932 2,907 2,775 13,905 19,587
1940 3,526 2,156 14,564 20,246
1950 5,361 1,707 17,123 24,191
1953 7,824 2,454 23,282 33,560
a Notavailable.
Thisfigure covers only "cities." The increase in 1843—70 is therefore somewhat
overstated by column 3. However, we may compare the debt of seventeen cities in January
1843 (reported in the United States Magazine and Democratic Review, February 1843, cited
by A. M. Hilihouse, Municipal Bonds, p. 33) with the bonded debt of these cities outstand-
ing in 1880 as reported in the census. For the seventeen cities the figures are: $25.5
million, 1843; $352 million, 1880. It is estimated that between 1843 and 1880 the popula-
tion of these seventeen cities nearly quadrupled, while the population in all cities of
more than 10,000 inhabitants increased more than sixfold. This suggests that the urban
debt increase, 1843—80, was around twentyfold rather than the twenty-six indicated in
column 3.
CSchooldistrict debt was $18 million in 1880, $37 million in 1890, and $46 million
in 1902. It is not separately identified for 1870.
NOTE: Figures are from the 1880 census for 1839—70; from the 1902 census for 1880—
1902. Column 1 includes territories and the District of Columbia. The former source
indicates that the figures in column I are gross, but it gives $260 million for gross state
debt in 1880. The figures for 1870 are apparently partly net of sinking funds. All figures
for 1880—1902 are net of sinking funds.
The 1880 census reports that from the time of the assumption of state debts in 1790
by the federal government to 1820 "but a small amount of state debt was contracted."
It further reports that, of the $174 million of stocks issued by eighteen states in 1820—38,
$108 million was issued during 1835—38.
Figures from 1902 to 1950 are from Governmental Debt in the United States 1916 and
Governmental Debt in 1950. Figures for 1953 are from Summary of Government Finances in 1953.
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During the l850's various states—in general not the states that had
defaulted after 1837—borrowed to finance public improvements. And
again following the crisis of 1857 there were financial difficulties, defaults,
and one repudiation.7 Then, during the Civil War there was extensive
state borrowing to finance the war, for war finance had not yet ceased to
be considered at least partly a state function. War debts of the Union
states totaled $112 million and known war debts of the Confederate states,
1865, $96 million.8 But, as the victorious federal government reimbursed
the northern states for army costs amounting to nearly 50 per cent of their
war-connected debts and as the war debts of the southern states were
repudiated, Table 24 reflects only a small part of this borrowing.
This table also fails to bring out the major developments in state and
local finance in the years immediately following the war—reconstruction
and alleged reconstruction borrowing mainly by states in the South, and
borrowing mainly by cities and other local governments in the North and
West, 1867—73, to finance new public improvements of various kinds. Per
capita debts of 130 cities increased from $37.30 in 1866 to $70.50 in
Some indication of the nature of the improvements financed by municipal
debt increases can presumably be gleaned from Table 2A, column 1. The
three largest debt purposes there are identified as water works, streets,
and railroads and other aid. As Hilihouse so pertinently remarks, "With
state aid for internal improvements checked, municipal aid filled the
gap."10 Municipal bond issues provided, in effect, a means of detouring
constitutional limitations on state borrowing, so far as aid to railroads was
concerned.
We noted in Chapter I that the ousting of the carpetbaggers was
followed by debt repudiations and compositions totaling more than $100
million. In view of their experiences with the carpetbaggers several
southern states adopted constitutional restrictions on state borrowing.
Also most of the states admitted to the Union after the Civil War included
debt restrictions in their constitutions. Even before 1873 a number of
states had adopted constitutionalrestrictions on local government
financing.'1 With the extensive defaults following the 1873 crisis—it has
been estimated that 20 per cent of all outstanding municipal debt was in
default'2—there came a "wave of sentiment favorable to rigid restrictions
on municipal indebtedness," and during 1873—79 restrictions on local
Repudiation by Minnesota, at that time a territory. See Ratchford, op.cit., p. 230.
See Ratchford, op.cit., pp. 136 and 151. A, M. Hilihouse, Municipal Bonds, pp. 61ff.,
notes that several cities borrowed to help finance the war.
Data are from Banker's Magazine (New York) cited by Secrist, op.cie. Practically
all of the cities of over 25,000 population must have been included in these data. And
the growth of debt was certainly concentrated in the years 1866 to 1873.
Op.cit.,p. 34.
Secrist,op.cit., p. 59.
12Thisestimate is cited by Hilihouse, op.cit., pp. 15—17.
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government financing were incorporated in the constitutions of eighteen
states.13 Indeed during the years following 1873 restrictions on local
borrowing, either constitutional or statutory, became general.
The severity and nature of the restrictions that were imposed on states
and on local units varied from state to state. As of the beginning of the
twentieth century about a quarter of the state constitutions vested broad
borrowing powers in their respective legislatures. So far as state financing
was concerned the other states were about equally divided into two groups.
In one group borrowing—except borrowing in a major emergency (such
as a war or an insurrection) or short-term borrowing in anticipation of
tax receipts—required a constitutional amendment. In the other group
most nonbudget, nonemergency borrowing required approval by a
popular referendum. In some states a constitutional upper limit on most
of the debt was set in terms of the ratio of specified types of debt to the
assessed value of property; in a few there was an absolute upper limit.
A number of constitutions prohibited borrowing for internal improve-
ments; a number prohibited the assumption of local debts; most of
them prohibited lending their credit to or becoming stockholders in
private enterprises.'4 And more detailed requirements were not infre-
quent: these included requiring that provision be made for a sinking
fund; fixing a maximum maturity period; prescribing a maximum interest
rate and prohibiting sale of bonds below par; and requiring the levying
of taxes to service the debt.
The restrictions imposed on local government borrowing have been
of a quite similar character, except that while some of them have been
written into state constitutions others have been merely statutes or
municipal charter provisions. In general there are such local restrictions
even in states like Massachusetts whose constitutions vest their legislatures
with broad borrowing powers. The requirement of a popular referendum
has been common. Frequently different quantitative restrictions have been
prescribed for different types of local government units and for different
classes of cities. Special limits have been set for several of the larger cities.
The debt to assessed property value limit has been widely used. For a time
a number of absolute limits were set.
We have noted the great increase in municipal debts, 1890—1929, and
in state and local debts generally, 1902—29. At least from 1910 on, as
Table 8 makes clear, this growth of debts took place despite a steady
increase in nonfinancial receipts. Table 8 also shows a cyclical decline
in such receipts, 1930—33, of some 6 per cent. No doubt this average figure
conceals significantly sharper declines for many individual units of
Secrist, op.ciL, pp. 60, 70, 71.
Forsummaries of leading provisions see ibid., Part I, Chapter 3, and Ratchford,
op.cit., Chapter XVII.
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government. A considerable number of units, too, had borrowed enough
and had large enough current commitments to find themselves in serious
financial difficulties. Several states were barely able to meet their obliga-
tions. And Arkansas, having assumed various local debts in addition to its
own, defaulted on certain of its interest payments in 1932—34. But in
general the particularly serious cases of financial distress were to be found
among local government units. Hilihouse puts the aggregate debts of the
local units defaulting during the depression of the 1930's at 10 per cent of
the total According to the Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
"Of the total bonds in default the cities of Chicago and Detroit represent
by far the largest amounts, the two of them together being responsible
for about 550,000,000."16 But many smaller units were in default, over
3,000 in all up to the end of About a fifth of these were in Florida.'8
Nearly 15 per cent of the reclamation, levee, irrigation, and drainage
districts were involved. No satisfactory estimate of the ultimate losses of
municipal bondholders during the 1930's seems to be available, but such
losses were presumably a very small part of the total value of bonds in
default.
The growth of state and local debt up to 1929 reflected the great
pressures for highways and various local improvements, pressures that in
turn reflected a combination of major technological changes and a rising
level of living. Partly because of these pressures, and partly because the
years from 1900 to 1929 were on the whole years of business expansion
and optimism, itwas inevitable that there should have been some relaxation
of state and local restrictions on borrowing. Absolute local debt limits
were replaced by limits permitting growth. North and South Dakota
amended their constitutions to give their state legislatures broader bor-
rowing powers; and court interpretations, particularly the special funds
doctrine, had the effect, in a number of states, of exempting highway and
bridge bonds and bonds of educational institutions and various special
agencies from constitutional restrictions on state borrowing.'9 But relaxa-
tions also took the form of various evasions of the constitutional and
statutory restrictions on local financing. The most important form of
evasion—and indeed the most substantial type of relaxation—involves
the growth of special districts, a development to which we will shortly give
attention.
Possibly it might have been expected that the financial distress of the
15Op.cit.,p.17. He compares this with the estimate of 20 per cent for the 1873
depression. Long-term local debt outstanding in 1932 totaled $14.8 billion.
'6.January 30, 1934, pp. 35ff. Presumably the reference to Chicago should read
"Cook County and three special districts in the Chicago area."
17Seethe Bond Buyer compilation summarized by Hilihouse, op.cit., p. 25.
18Commercialand Financial Chronicle, January 30, 1934, pp. 35ff.
SeeRatchford, op.cit., p. 434.
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1930's, like that following 1873, would lead to some tightening of restric-
tions on public borrowing. Indeed by constitutional amendments Arkansas
and North Carolina did make popular referendum, instead of legislative
enactment, the main procedure for authorizing state debt issues. But on
the whole what was done during the 1930's did not assume the form of
imposing additional or more carefully drawn inflexible statutory and
constitutional limitations and requirements along the lines of those es-
tablished in the nineteenth century. Instead there were steps in the direc-
tion of temporary state administrative supervision or control of the finances
of defaulting local units. Thus several states adopted measures during the
1930's for the administrative supervision of distress refunding issues.20
Several states, too, earmarked state-collected, locally shared taxes to
insure the servicing of defaulting local highway 'and other debt issues.21
A more radical procedure, the administrative receivership of municipal
corporations, was experimented with in three states and authorized in a
fourth, and there were a number of states that made statutory provision
for court-appointed receivers for defaulting special districts and municip-
ally owned utilitics.22 It should be added that the federal bankruptcy act
was amended in 1937 and 1940 to enable federal courts to give effect to
appropriately approved plans for the composition of the debts of local
government units.23
2. The Rise of Special Districts
Table 25 summarizes the part played by school and special district
debts in the growth of total local government debt. Such units were un-
important borrowers before 1880. Indeed special districts were of little
more than negligible consequence even in 1902; this type of governmental
unit was then just beginning to come into use. Between 1902 and 1932
total local debts (net of sinking funds) increased nearly $13.6 billion. Of
this amount school and special districts together accounted for nearly a
quarter, and school districts alone for over 14 per cent. During the next
decade most local governmental units retired some of their indebtedness;
school districts showed a net retirement of nearly 18 per cent. But the
depression apparently did not check the increased recourse to the special
district type of unit. Seven states for which the 1932 Census reported no
special district debts or taxes had special district net debt amounting to
20SeeHilihouse, op.cit., pp. 330ff.
21.Ibid.
22Onthe administrative receiverships see Wylie Kilpatrick, State Supervision of Local
Finance, pp. 42 and 64. On court receiverships see Hilihouse, op.cit., pp. 297—320 and 349.
It may be noted that the statistical status of defaulting public corporations is
somewhat anomalous. During the 1920's the Investment Bankers Association of America
started and then dropped a project to establish a reporting service on defaulted liabilities
comparable to the Dun and Bradstreet series for private businesses. Apparently the
project was dropped because it was felt this type of market information would hamper
sales. Cf. Hilihouse, op.cit., p. 518.
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$84 million ten years later. The total debt of all special districts more than
doubled in these ten years, and in 1942 it exceeded that of school districts.
During the nine years ending 1951 school and special districts together
accounted for more than half of the $3.7 billion of total local debt increase.
It is clear that a substantial part of local government financing during
the past half-century has been financed by school and special districts.
TABLE 25
The Growth of School and Special District Debt, Selected Years, 1880—195 1
School Special Total Local School Special
District Dijirict Governmen.. District District
Debt Debt Debt Debt Debt
(millionsof dollars) (per cent of total local
government debt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1880 18 a 849 2.1 a
1890 37 a 926 .4.0 a
1902 46 5 1,630 2.8 0.3
1913 119b 36b 3,477b 3.4 1.0
1922 1,053 626 7,754 13.6 8.1
1932 2,034 1.3G9 15,216 13.3 9.0
1942 2,791 14,965 11.1 18.7
1951 3,076 3,253 18,669 16.5 17.4
a Negligible.
bPlacesof less than 2,500 inhabitants not enumerated.
NOTE: Dollar figures are for gross debts less sinking fund assets as reported by the
Bureau of the Census.
It is convenient to use the term "special district" in a sense which
excludes school districts, but the school district may be said to be the
prototype. The special district is, in general, a governmental unit devoted
to one particular government function, or occasionally to two or three
particular functions. In most cases the operations of the unit are confined
to a district which is a small part of a state. And as a rule the unit is
clearly autonomous and has a separate budget of its own, but sometimes
the difference between a special district and a municipal department is
not very wide. Table 26 classifies the 12,000-odd special districts in
existence in 1952 by functional types. An increasing number of these
government units are being established to undertake the construction and
operation of revenue-producing facilities such as port facilities, airports,
toll roads, and bridges.
There is something of a contrast between private corporations and
municipal and other public corporations in respect to the incentives that
make for and against consolidation. The sacrifices entailed in the decreased
number of top jobs are perhaps similar in the two cases, but the loss of local
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autonomy when two or more geographically adjacent units of government
are combined is likely to be a more serious deterrent to combining than
any corresponding loss in the case of a horizontal business combination.
The nearest thing to the profit incentive making for consolidations of
public corporations is the incentive to economical and efficient operation,
and this incentive makes principally for the consolidation of geographically
TABLE 26












Irrigation and water conservation 6.1
Other 428
Cemeteries 911
Urban water supply 665
Other 651
SOURCE: Data are from Bureau of the Census, Governments in the United States in 1952.
adjacent like units; there is scarcely any analogue of the incentive to
vertical integration. Doubtless there is some gain in prestige for those who
engineer a consolidation of public corporations that promises more efficient
or economical operations, but the prestige gained is probably rather
smaller than that attaching to many private consolidations.
We take the weakness of the incentives to consolidate government
units and the strength of the deterrents to consolidation to constitute one
of the main reasons for the growth of special districts. In the first place,
when there are serious obstacles to a city's annexing adjacent territory,
most of the advantage in efficiency and economy that might be realized by
such annexation may perhaps be obtained by establishing special school,
sewage, water supply, and fire districts to serve the larger area. Again,
when there are public functions that require operation over a territory
larger than—or at any rate other than—a metropolitan area, such as the
construction and maintenance of levees, and drainage and irrigation
systems, the special district is often the answer to the jurisdictional prob-
lem. Further, the need for combining adjacent jurisdictions to make
possible the performance of a function or to provide for performing it
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efficiently may go beyond the local level. Thus some units, like the Port
of New York Authority, are interstate special districts. And the joint
authority device is quite capable of handling a problem of combining
jurisdictions even at the international level as in the case of the Buffalo
and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority.
But there is a second main reason for the growth of special districts.
Establishing such units has proven a very convenient method of openly
evading, or in effect amending, debt limits and other restrictions on local
governments. If a maximum debt to assessed property value ratio has
been prescribed for cities, the establishment of school and special districts
with separate borrowing powers to take over some of the municipal
functions means a defacto increase in debt limits. Similarly if maximum
tax limits are prescribed and the new special districts are given taxing
powers, there is a defacto increase in tax limits. Further, the special district
device can be used to make defacto exceptions to civil service procedures.
It is little wonder that some special districts appear to have been created
merely as incidents in political manipulation.
One cannot hope to apportion responsibility for the growth of school
and special district debts as between the necessity for or advantage of
having a jurisdiction appropriate to the performance of a particular public
function on the one hand and the desire openly to evade restrictions on
borrowing, the levying of taxes, etc. on the other. But it may be noted
that both these influences in some measure reflect technological change.
Thus the development of improved transportation makes it possible for a
school to service a larger area; the development of improved equipment
(e.g. fire fighting equipment) calls for raising more money and this in turn
puts pressure on debt and tax limits. And it may also be noted that there is
no reason to expect the particularly rapid growth of special district debt
in the past few years to slacken in the near future. It is estimated that
school districts accounted for about two-thirds of total long-term school
debt in 1951.24 But, if water supply systems are indicative of special district
functions, special districts apparently have plenty of room left to grow in;
in 1952 they accounted for only about a sixth of total water supply system
long-term debt.25
Most school and special districts are quite small. Nearly two-thirds of
the school districts had less than fifty pupils each in 1952. More than a
third of the special districts—and almost half of those devoted to fire
protection—had no separate paid employees. Seventy-one per cent of the
special districts had no outstanding debt. If this legal form of organization
See note on Table 23 in Appendix A.
25Onspecial district debt see Bureau of the Census, Special District Governments in the
United States, 1954, p. 8. The total of other water supply system debt was estimated on the
basis of Bureau of the Census data for systems of cities of over 25,000 population, the
total debt of these cities, and the total debt of all cities.
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seems to offer some encouragement to larger-scale combinations, it has
also facilitated a great deal of very small-scale operation. Still, mainly as
a result of consolidations the number of school districts was reduced 47
per cent between 1932 and 1952.
Some special districts have been established to perform new govern-
ment functions such as the maintenance and operation of an airport.
Others have government functions of long standing: sewage systems, fire
TABLE 27
Local Government Units in the Continental United States and Their Debts, 1951
Number GrOss Gross Per Cent Debt
of Debt Debt of 195)Per Unit
Units 1951 1902 Debts in 1951
(millionsof dollars) (thousands
of dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A.Counties 3,049 1,875 205 9.1 615
B.Townships 17,202 411 57 2.0 24















E.School districts 67,346 3,257 46 15.7 48
F.Special districts 12,319 3,403 5 16.5 276
G.Total 116,694 20,667 1,925 100.0 182
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Governments in the United States in 1952 and Governmental
Debt, 1951. The number of counties reported on line A includes ten that are identified
with city governments.
protection stations, highways. And of course school districts perform a
long-recognized government function. Indeed a large proportion of the
functions of these new forms of government have been taken over from
older forms, particularly from municipalities.
It is not surprising therefore that Table 27 shows that the increase in
the financing functions of school and special districts in the last half-
century has been mainly at the expense of cities. Five-sixths of all local
debts in 1902 were municipal; it is little wonder the term has sometimes
been used to cover all state and local issues. In 1951 less than three-fifths
of the total were municipal. The units here called townships are to be
found in twenty-two states. They include what are locally termed "towns"
in New England, New York, and Wisconsin (as well as some "plantations"
in Maine). Densely populated townships in New England, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania—and to a less extent in New York and Wisconsin—may
perform various functions commonly associated with municipalities. Their
importance has decreased from 3 per cent to 2 per cent of the total.
Counties have almost held their own.
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3. Grants-in-Aid and Changes in Fiscal Functions
In 1952 there were over 113,000 local government units in the United
States. But the 482 cities of over 25,000 population in 1950 and the
special districts having debts of over $1 million each together accounted for
more than half of the total local debt in 1951. Apart from the tax-exempt
privileges they enjoy, the many thousand smaller units of government are
presumably not in a particularly advantageous position to borrow.
Credit standing on the whole improves with increased size; so does the
ability to place a loan on advantageous terms. Even the average city of
over 25,000 is relatively a considerably smaller-scale borrower than the
average state. The $20.7 million of debt per city compares with an average
debt per state of $133 million. In 1950 the average amount of long-term
debt issued by cities of 25,000 to 50,000 population was $403,000 per city;
by cities of 50,000 to 100,000 population it was $723,000; by cities of
500,000 to 1,000,000 population it was $11.75 million; for the five cities
of over a million it was $80 million; for the states it was $28 million per
state.
Thus far we have considered mainly those cases of changes in the
responsibilities for meeting financial requirements that have entailed
transfers of substantive functions from one type of government unit to
another. The comparisons just made suggest another kind of change, one
brought about by grants-in-aid. One factor in the growth of state grant-
in-aid programs is that, in respect to credit standing and ability to place
loans advantageously, states are in a much better position to borrow than
are the vast majority of local government units. And superior ability to
borrow in combination with, the huge growth of state aid helps to explain
why the states have been going into debt more rapidly than local govern-
ments. In 1902 states were obligors for less than one-eighth of the total
gross state and local debt outstanding; in 1953 for 23 per cent. (See Table
24.)
But in connection with the shifting of part of the financial responsi-
bility for local government functions to the states through grant-in-aid
programs there is need to consider the whole budget, both state and
local. We saw in Chapter III that state employment has grown more
rapidly than local, and presumably by the same token so have state
expenditures on other objects than grants-in-aid. We saw, too, that state
tax receipts have grown more rapidly still. The great increase in state
receipts was accomplished through the development of new tax sources;
state property tax receipts were slightly less in 1950 than in 1932. But
local governments have continued to depend heavily on the real prop-
erty tax, and even in 1950 they were only beginning to tap new tax
sources.
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It would seem that the states have had a superior ability to raise
money through taxation as well as borrowing. In part this means that
major new taxes—income, gasoline, alcoholic beverage, tobacco, and
general sales taxes—can be more effectively administered on a state-wide
basis; in part that even the limited recourse by local units to new tax
sources that has taken place has required the states to grant them addi-
tional taxing powers. Probably it means, too, that the change in the struc-
ture of the tax system brought about by the development of the new taxes
has somehow facilitated the vast expansion in tax revenues, even though
the facilitation has presumably been primarily political rather than eco-
nomic in nature.
To the extent that fiscal considerations have contributed to the growth
of state grant-in-aid programs, we can say that this growth results from a
combination of a very substantial expansion of local government functions
—but a less rapid expansion than in the case of the states—and the superior
ability of states to raise money by taxing and by borrowing. But nonfiscal
considerations have been a factor too. In particular, states have sought to
raise and maintain standards of performance of local government func-
tions—education, welfare, and highways are the programs identified in
Table 28—and to reduce interlocal inequalities in these standards of
performance. No doubt these objectives involve some fiscal considerations
in addition to those already noted. Interlocal differences in performance
may be due to differences in ability to finance, the effects of which are
diminished by the grants; also in the case of highway grants-in-aid one
objective may be to make the (gasoline) tax fall on those responsible for
the cost of the service. Further, the figures on state grants include state-
collected, locally shared taxes; the main motive for this kind of aid is
presumably improved efficiency in tax collection.
But raising, maintaining, and equalizing standards are clearly sub-
stantive rather than fiscal objectives; and to the extent that their realiza-
tion requires state interference with local self-government the grant-in-aid
device is a most agreeable form for the interference to take.
Table 28 outlines the growth of both federal and state grants-in-aid.
State highway and welfare aid programs were apparently started a little
earlier than federal programs in these fields. From the beginning aid to
education has been the major type of state grants; and to date there have
been only peripheral federal programs in this area such as the vocational
training of veterans and school lunch programs.
Federal aid increased from less than one per cent of federal non-
financial receipts and about 2.5 per cent of state receipts in 1913 to 17.2
per cent of state receipts and nearly 5 per cent of federal in 1950. State
aid seems to have been a consistently larger total than federal. Even in
1913 (when the full amount cannot be identified) it must have been nearly
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Intergovernmental Aid Compared to Nonfinancial Receipts,
Selected Years, 1913—50
1913 1929 1942 1950
Millions of dollars
A.Federal nonfinancial receipts 980 4,950 23,700 49,100
B.Federal aid 9 117 888 2,339
C.State nonfinancial receipts 368 2,375 6,870 13,600
D.State aid 87a 647" 1,791 4,011
E.Local nonfinancial receipts 1,882 6,325 8,630 18,000
F.Aid received by larger cities 26c 116 394d 744e
C.Nonfinancial receipts of larger cities 700c 2,597 2,5l6d 4,512e
Per cent
H.B/A 0.9 2.4 3.8 4.8
J.B/C 2.4 4.9 12.9 17.2
K.D/C 23.6 27.3 26.1 29.5
L.DIE 4.6 10.2 20.7 22.3
M. F/G 3.7 4.5 15.6 16.5
THE LARGER FEDERAL AID PROGRAMS
Millions of dollars
N.Highways 0 84 164 455
P.Public assistance and relief 0 0 412k 1,123
Q.Employment security 0 0 72 215g
R.Public health and maternal and
child welfare 0 1 31 214"
S.Vocational training and
rehabilitation 0 8 134 55
T.Agriculture and forestryl 2° 12 29 61
U.Total above 2° 105 842 2,123
THE LARGER STATE PROGRAMS
Millions of dollars
V.Highways 194 338 576
W.Welfare m m 389 733
X.Schools 98k 336 766 1,982
Y.Total above 110k 530 1,493 3,291
NOTE: Figures on lines A and B, 1929 through 1950, are on a calendar year basis;
other dollar amounts are on a fiscal year basis. Lines F and G are for cities of more than
100,000 population; but see note d. Some grants-in-aid are paid by local governments;
in 1942 such payments totaled $48 million. Cities of over 250,000 population received
$3 million in local grants in 1942; 822 million in 1950. There are major types of inter-
government payments not treated as grants-in-aid in this table; see accompanying text.
a Incomplete total. Only highway and education grants were fully identified for these
years.
b By interpolation on data for 1927 and 1932.
1912 figure.
d This figure is for 1940. It covers only city corporations; figures for 1912 and 1929
include computed portions of receipts of overlying counties and school and special
districts. On this more comprehensive basis the figure for line F is $540 million; for line G,
$3,156 million.
e This figure covers only city corporations.
The total was $975 million in 1936.
gIncludesreimbursements for administering veterans' readjustment allowances.
h Includes school lunch program.
i Excludes colleges of agriculture.
k 1915 figure.
m Not available.
SOURCE: See Appendix A.
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a quarter of state nonfinancial receipts and nearly 5 per cent of local
receipts. By 1950 these ratios had risen to about 29 per cent and 22 per
cent respectively. But again it should be noted that the figures on line D
include state-collected, locally shared taxes.
It can be argued that for 1942 and 1950 the ratios on lineJ understate
the importance of federal aid, because the figures for total state non-
financial receipts include withdrawals from the Unemployment Com-
pensation Fund while the figures on line B do not. Excluding such
withdrawals from their denominators the ratios become respectively 15.5
and 19.2 per cent.
Aid seems to have represented a smaller proportion of nonfinancial
receipts for the larger cities than for other local units from the very start.
The considerations which have led to the growth of federal aid are
somewhat similar to those already noted in the case of the states. The
federal government has fiscal advantages over the states; and it has sought
to promote standards for the performance of various state functions and to
decrease interstate inequalities in performance. Some of the substantive
objectives of federal aid programs might have involved both political
and constitutional difficulties had a less agreeable method than offering
grants on the condition of meeting the standards been employed. In
general the substantive considerations seem to have been more important
in federal than in state aid programs. The public assistance and relief
grants were intended to provide a national system of benefits to relieve
general unemployment and aid the blind, the aged, mothers of dependent
children, and the totally disabled in a way that would complement the
national unemployment and old age insurance programs. The employment
security grants—for state unemployment compensation administrations
and employment exchanges—have constituted integral parts of the un-
employment insurance system. The highway grants have provided a
national system of rural roads which, among other things, serves the
interests of national defense. Both the grants for veterans' education and
rehabilitation and those for agriculture are small parts of broad federal
programs. And one may suspect that the present health and education
grants are parts of incipient more ambitious programs.
Table 29 analyzes by regions ratios for 1952 which are approximately
equivalent to those shown on lines J and K of Table 28. All but 7 per cent
of the intergovernmental revenue is federal aid; the intergovernmental
expenditure includes in addition to state aid only a small unidentified
amount of reimbursements for the cost of services performed by other
units; total revenue is a slightly less inclusive concept than total non-
financial receipts. Aid received is in general a larger proportion of state
revenue in those states where per capita income payments to individuals
are relatively low. The proportion of state revenue paid out in local aid
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follows no clear pattern. Presumably the ratios in column 5 reflect both
the extent of the need to supplement local fiscal capacity and the degree to
which the various states have sought to influence the standards of per-
formance of local government functions.
Not quite all grants-in-aid are paid by federal and state governments;
but no comprehensive recent compilation of total local grants is available.
In 1942 local grants amounted to $48 million, or about 2 per cent of the
TABLE 29
1952 Intergovernmental Revenue and Expenditure and Total Revenue of





(per cent) (millions of dollars) (per cent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.New England 13.8 146 1,061 244 23.0 1,763
B.Middle East 10.0 370 3,698 1,035 28.0 1,892
C.S. East 18.3 578 3,157 871 27.6 1,127
D.S. West 21.0 253 1,205 334 27.7 1,422
B.Central 13.8 582 4,201 1,299 30.9 1,782
F.N. West 21.5 213 990 276 27.9 1,541
G.Far West 13.5 347 2,507 980 38.1 1,928
H.Total 14.8 2,485 16,815 5,044 30.0 1,644
Data for the Middle Eastern region (Del., D.C., Md., N.J., N.Y., Pa., and W. Va.)
in columns 2, 3, and 4 do not include the District of Columbia. Other regions and the
states they include are Southeast: Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Miss., N.C., S.C.,
Tenn., and Va.; Southwest: Ariz., N. Mex., Okia., and Tex.; Central: Ill., md., Iowa,
Mich., Minn., Mo., Ohio, and Wisc.; Northwest: Cob., Ida., Kan., Mont., Nebr., N.D.,
S.D., Utah, and Wyo.; Far West: Calif., Nev., Ore., and Wash.
SouRcEs: Columns 2, 3, and 4, State Government Finances in 1952; Column 6, Survey of
Current Business, August 1954, p. 15. Note: Details may not add to totals because of
rounding.
grants by all levels of government in that year. Three-quarters of the 1942
local grants were made by counties.
At least in respect to fiscal considerations cash grants by one nation to
others, either directly or through United Nation channels, should be
classed with grants to state and local governments. But we will defer
comment on international grants to Chapter VIII.
4. Summary
Because of the changes that have taken place in the apportionment
of substantive government functions among the various levels of govern-
ment and because of the growth of federal and state aid programs, it is
advisable to consider the financial requirements of all the levels of
government together.
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Formerly states shared with the federal government the responsibility
for expanding and equipping the army in time of war; what remains of
state responsibility for the National Guard is unlikely again to involve
state governments in war finance. And although state and local govern-
ments formerly engaged in extending credit to and guaranteeing the
credit of privately owned undertakings, such activities are today almost
exclusively federal functions.
Past financial difficulties have led to the imposition of various restric-
tions on the borrowing powers first of state and later of local governments.
With restrictions on state borrowing and on state aid to railroads
and other enterprises incorporated in the constitutions of many states
between the crisis of 1837 and the end of the Civil War, municipal aid
programs and municipal borrowing expanded rapidly, 1866—73. Then the
financial difficulties following the 1873 crisis led to a wave of restrictions
on local borrowing.
In 1902 school and special district debts were less than 3 per cent of all
local debts. By 1951 this ratio had increased to nearly one-third. These
districts have important advantages from the point of view of the horizon-
tal integration of local government functions. They are also means of
getting around debt and tax limits and other legal restrictions on local
governments. Some of the functions of these units are new; most of them
have been taken over from other forms of local government, particularly
municipalities, and from the states.
The relative importance of the financial requirements of school and
special districts is likely to continue to increase. Consolidations decreased
the number of school districts between 1932 and 1952, and this process
too is likely to continue. In the course of time it may embrace special
districts as well.
States have been assuming responsibility for providing a larger and
larger share of the costs of local government, and the federal government
has been doing so for both states and local units. In 1950 federal aid was
17.2 per cent of state nonfinancial receipts. Fiscal considerations have
played an important part in aid programs—particularly the advantages
of the federal government and the states over other units both as tax
collectors and as borrowers. Another major set of considerations, more
important in the case of federal than of state programs, relates to sub-
stantive policies: the promotion of standards of performance and uniform
performance on the part of the units of government receiving the aid. The
grant-in-aid device is an agreeable form for such supervision of local and
of state performance to take, and in the case of federal aid a form that
sometimes avoids the possibility of constitutional questions.
In general, federal aid is a larger proportion of state revenues in
those parts of the country in which personal income per capita is low.
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Fiscal Flexibility and Countercyclical
Financial Requirements
Since World War I and more especially since the 1929—33 recession
there has been an increasing tendency to think that the federal government
has some measure of responsibility for seeing that the employment of our
manpower and material resources is kept at a high and fairly stable level.
We have noted that practically all of the net federal debt that is not
war debt is attributable to efforts to discharge this responsibility during
the l930's. From 1929 to 1939 net federal debt increased by $16 billion,
and we may take this amount as a rough measure of depression-connected
debt.
in this chapter we will first review federal fiscal policy during the
years when the full-employment responsibility was emerging as a new
government function, then examine the experiences of the 1930's and of
three recessions that have occurred since that decade as they bear on the
financial requirements which this function may entail.
Past experience seems to make it advisable to distinguish two sets of
circumstances under which measures designed to maintain or raise the
level of employment may occasion financial requirements. On the one
hand there have been short, relatively minor recessions from high level
employment that have commonly been followed without great delay by
periods of substantial prosperity. On the other hand there have been
periods of far more severe unemployment. We propose therefore to treat
separately the experience of the 1930's and the recessions of 1945, 1949,
and 1953—54. Whatever the future may have in store in the way of business
recessions, we deem it advisable to deal separately with the experience of
the l930's and, despite the minor cyclical peak in 1937, to treat 1929—40 as
a single period.
1. On the Evolution of Fiscal Policy
Before World War I federal fiscal policy reflected business cycles in
a passive sense only. Table 30 shows average annual general receipts and
surpluses by alternate periods of relatively good and relatively poor
business. In the absence of a countercyclical policy we might expect both
column 1 and column 2 to increase or decrease with general business
activity. In seven out of the thirteen cases shown they do. And the other
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TABLE 30
Federal General Receipts and Surpluses by Selected Business Cycle
Periods, 1867—19 15
(annualaverages for fiscalyears in millionsof dollars)
Years of
Relatively Good NBER
and Relatively •Receipts Surpluses Contraction Periods
Poor Business (1) (2) (3)
1867—73 395.6 77.5 June 1869—Dec. 1870
1874—79 283.3 18.8 Oct. 1873—Mar. 1879
1880—82 365.9 103.8
1883—85 356.8 100.2 Mar. 1882—May 1885




340.6 —25.4 Jan. 1893—June 1894
Dec. 1895—June 1897
1898—1902 527.7 11.9 June 1899—Dec. 1900
1903—04 551.5 1.2 Sept. 1902—Aug. 1904
1905—07 601.7 32.8
1908 601.8 —57.3 May 1907—June 1908
1909—10 639.9 —53.8
1911 701.8 10.6 Jan. 1910—Jan. 1912
1912—13 708.4 1.2
1914—15 716.3 —31.5 Jan. 1913—Dec. 1914
SOURCE: Columns 1 and 2 are from Historical Statistics, pp. 89, 97. Column 2 reports
the excess of nonfinancial receipts over nonfinancial expenditures. General receipts in
column 1 are less than total nonfinancial receipts by the amount of postal revenues. The
left-hand dates in column 3 are upper cyclical turning points, the right-hand dates are the
immediately following lower turning points. The dates are from A. F. Burns and W. C.
Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, pp. 510—511. Thus three of the periods here classified
as periods of relatively good business include minor recessions: 1867—73, 1886—92, and
1898—1902; and the period of relatively poor business, 1893—97, includes a minor up-
swing.
six can hardly be considered exceptions to the rule of a cyclically passive
fiscal policy.
There was a persistent surplus in 1866—92, resulting in large part from
the retention of customs duties at not far from the levels they had reached
during the Civil War. The contracyclical drop in the average surplus from
$100 million in 1883—85 to $74 million during the next seven years was
mainly the result of steps taken to eliminate this surplus, particularly
various increases in veterans' pensions in 1886—90 and the substitution in
the McKinley Tariff Act (1890) of a subsidy on domestic sugar for the
previous import duty.
In three of the cases shown the surplus declines when business activity
declines, but not as a result of decreased receipts: 1903—04, 1908, and
1914—15. However, there is no reason to regard the expenditure increases
in these three cases as reflecting a countercyclical policy. The chief factor
in 1903—04 was the $50 million purchase cost of the Panama Canal. And
while in 1908 there were various increases in expenditures, particularly
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those on the War and Navy Departments, on the Panama Canal and rivers
and harbors, and on veterans' pensions, these must have been authorized
by Congress by the midsummer of 1907. Again, the 1914—15 deficit
reflected mainly a resumption in the marked upward trend in expenditures
following a temporary check in 1909—12. But in this instance the revenue
increase was small too, owing in part to a cut in customs receipts following
the Underwood Tariff Act (1913).
While the cases of positive cyclical correlation help to support the
proposition that before 1916 federal fiscal policy reflected business cycles
in a passive sense only, the decrease in receipts from 1886—92 to 1893—97
by no means fully explains the $100 million surplus drop. Increased
pensions and other expenditures were factors here too. And while the
average surplus increased simultaneously with an improvement in business
conditions from 1893—97 to 1898—1902, dropped during the 1902—04
business contraction, and rose againwith improved business in 1905—07,
the 1898—1902 surplus increase reflects in large measure the prompt
enactment of war taxes during the brief Spanish-American War and the
continuation of most of these emergency levies until 1901. On the other
hand if the relationship between surpluses and cycles seems to be negative,
1909—12, this appearance results at least in part from the failure of fiscal
year-ends to coincide with cyclical turning points.
On the whole the attitude of the federal government toward the cycle
throughout this period was one of laissez fiuire both with respect to the
possibility of controlling or influencing the level of gross national product
and with respect to measures for relieving or diminishing the suffering
caused by business recessions and depressions. Indeed, in accord with this
philosophy it was in general considered that provision of relief beyond
what could come from private charity was the responsibility of local
governments, and that relief should be given only to persons incapable of
self-support and should be provided through poorhouses and orphan
asylums rather than in the form of an "out-relief" dole. However, the
Homestead Act, the veterans' programs, the Indian reservation policy
since the Dawes Act (1887), and the extension of relief to victims of
various major disasters might be cited as exceptions to this view of govern-
ment functions.
Though the laissez faire philosophy dominated the attitudes of the
federal government toward business cycles, the main components of the
tax system were, paradoxically, of a regulatory nature. Thus the protective
tariff together with the excises on alcoholic beverages and tobacco manu-
factures yielded almost nine-tenths of total general receipts in 1880 and
were still yielding about this proportion in 1910.1 But despite their
regulatory character these revenue sources were quite compatible with one
1Thatis, nine-tenths of total nonfinancial receipts other than postal revenues.
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basic tenet of laissezfaire fiscal policy—a balanced budget. And from 1890
to 1916 the gross federal debt was approximately stabilized at a little over
billion.
During the period following the Civil War the idea of federal responsi-
bility for taking steps to end bad times or assure good ones was injected
into political campaigns in various ways. Both Greenback and Populist
parties were concerned to remedy the hard times for farmers and urban
wage earners that followed deflationary financial crises.2 And it can be
cogently argued that the real issue in the campaign of 1896 was whether
the free coinage of silver in the ratio of 16 to 1 or retention of "sound
money" together with a tariff that protected "the full dinner pail" was
the more effective countercyclical policy.
With the somewhat buoyant business that characterized the early
years of the twentieth century, agitation for countercyclical measures
concentrated for a time on revising the banking and monetary system so
that it would not be a cyclically disturbing influence. Then, a decade after
the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, the Reserve Board in its
Tenth Annual Report proposed, in part because "central bank practices
associated with an effective international gold standard are now inopera-
tive," to substitute "current surveys of business conditions" for "the
reserve ratio" as a guide to its credit policy.3 Thus it adopted a counter-
cyclical credit policy as a major objective.
During the 1920's the federal government took one other step that
could be characterized as a move in the direction of a countercycle—it
accepted some responsibility for helping farmers to dispose of agricultural
surpluses. Thus when the 1929—33 recession began there were several more
or less established policies that could be brought to bear on it: Federal
Reserve policy, the veterans' benefits program, and Federal Farm Board
loans on commodities to cooperatives and stabilization corporations. To
these were quite promptly added an acceleration of work on federal con-
struction projects and increased grants-in-aid of road construction to the
states. Table 31 relates the countercyclical expenditure programs under-
taken during the early 1930's to the gross national product. If the increases
in federal expenditures in 1929—31 seem extremely small in relation to the
2"Twoof the three Presidential candidates (1876—1884) nominated by the Greenback
party represented labor rather than agriculture." Earl D. Ross, "The Emergence of
Agricultural Regionalism," in The Growth of the American Economy, edited by Harold F.
Williamson, pp. 385—86. According to Studenski and Krooss, Financial History of the
United States, p. 221, the legislation for which Coxey's army pleaded in 1893 included
bdls to authorize the issue of "8500 million of noninterest-bearing legal-tender notes
by the federal government to finance construction of roads," and by state and local
governments of "noninterest-bearing bonds against the credit of the United States up




drop in gross national product, and if expenditures were contracted in
I it must be remembered that belief in balancing the budget was
still prevalent. Both major parties had balance-the-budget planks in their
1932 platforms. Probably it should be added, too, that three times during
TABLE 31
Various Federal Expenditure Programs and Federal Credit, 1929—33
(millions of dollars, calendar years)
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
A.Benefit payments to veteransa 562 603 1,577 781 554
B.Direct new construction
expenditures 155 209 271 333 346
C.Construction grants-in-aid
to states 80 104 235 111 286
D.Work relief payrolls 0 0 0 0 356
E.Total nonfinancialexpenditures 3,700 3,800 5,050 4,100 5,050
F.Federal Farm Board cumulative
advances less repayments,
December 31 41 232b 436b 480c 334d
G.Other Farm Credit Administra-
tion loans outstanding,
December 31 1,282 1,328 1,349 1,335 1,633
H.Reconstruction Finance
Corporation portfolio of non-
agricultural loans and securities 0 0 0 1,187 1,993
J.Gross national product 104,43691,10576,27158,46655,964
a Includesloans on the security of adjusted service certificates. Loans made on such
security by the United States Government Life Insurance Fund are not included in line E.
b Includes a small amount of delinquent loans.
As of May 26, 1933, when the Board and other agricultural credit agencies were
consolidated into the Farm Credit Administration. Includes $13.5 million of foreclosed
loans on wheat, collateral for which had been donated to the Red Cross, and $5 million
of delinquent loans.
ci A part of the decrease from May 26 (footnote c above) reflects losses. Total losses
in 1935 were estimated at $345 million (see Appendix A).
SOURCE: See Appendix A.
1930—32 temporary reversals of the downward trend of industrial pro-
duction seem to give some ground for thinking "prosperity is just around
the corner."
The federal countercyclical expenditure programs. identified in Table
31 undoubtedly set a new precedent regarding federal responsibilities.
But they did very little to provide unemployment relief. And as the reces-
sion continued and incomes and employment declined further and further,
the need for relief and assistance grew far beyond what local and private
agencies could provide. Indeed, with the decline in personal and national
income the ability of such agencies to finance relief and assistance programs
"Federal payrolls other than work relief payrolls decreased from $1,353 million in
1932 to $1,232 million in 1933.
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was seriously curtailed. In September 1931 New York State established a
Temporary Emergency Relief Administration and appropriated $20
million5 for state aid to localities for unemployment relief. Other states
followed New York's example. But the problem had become too large
even for the states, and in July 1932 Congress, after more than six months
of consideration, passed a $322 million appropriation bill (the Emergency
Relief and Construction Act of 1932), which authorized the newly organ-
ized Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make $300 million of
to states and local governments for unemployment relief. Originally it
had been expected that the RFC would extend financial assistance to
agriculture, commerce, and industry by making loans to banks and other
financial institutions; and it had been intended that the corporation should
confine its operations to "fully and adequately secured" loans.6 But the
nearly $300 million of loans extended to states under the enlarged RFC
authority of the July 1932 act were later made forgiven debts. And in
May 1933 Congress passed another Federal Emergency Relief Act which
made unemployment relief definitely a federal function. Moreover, 1933
saw the inauguration of what turned out to be a $12 billion work relief
program.7
Other steps taken during 1933—39—they are considered in Section 2
below—broadened federal responsibilities both for promoting an increase
in business activity when business is poor and for relieving the distress
caused by a depression. But the objective of a balanced budget had not
been entirely dropped. In March 1933, pursuant to a recommendation
by President Roosevelt, Congress had passed an Economy Act providing
for a 15 per cent cut in federal salaries and for restricting the payments of
veterans' pensions.8 Also the years 193 1—36 were characterized byageneral
upward trend in tax rates and a resort to additional tax revenue sources.
As a result the ratio of federal taxes to gross national product increased
from 3.5 per cent in 1929 to 7.5 per cent in And in 1935, despite
Intended to last eight months. Another $20 million was appropriated five months
later.
Cf. the first Quarterly Report, March 31, 1932, p. 2.
The Civilian Conservation Corps was organized in April, the Civil Works Admini-
stration in November 1933. The Works Progress Administration was organized in May,
the National Youth Administration in June 1935.
Cf. footnote 4 above on federal payrolls. The cut proved to be temporary. See
Table 31 on veterans' benefits. Veterans' benefits were reduced again in 1934. They
were $554 million in 1933; $452 million in 1934.
°Thenumerators of these ratios are net tax accruals and miscellaneous receipts
computed from Tables 8, 34, and 35 of the 1954 National Income Supplement to the Survey
of Current Business. They equal total federal receipts minus contributions for social insurance
on account of federal civilian employee retirement systems and government life insurance.
The comparison presumably understates the increase, because of the "built-in flexibility"
of the individual and corporation income taxes. In 1937, 14.3 per cent of the labor force
was unemployed; in 1929, only 3.2 per cent.
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the fact that there were over ten million unemployed,, work relief payrolls
were cut 20 per cent below their 1934 level to $61 1million. But in
January 1936 Congress passed a veterans' bonus bill over a presidential
veto.
Although the deficit in nonfinancial transactions showed a decrease of
about $500 million in 1935,10 on the whole federal fiscal policy for 1933—36
pushed in the direction of an increase in gross national product. But from
1936 to 1937 the push was markedly in the other direction. The nonfinan-
cial transactions deficit dropped from a little under $5 billion to less
than $50 million.1' In substantial part this drop resulted from what the
veterans' bonus added to the 1936 deficit. But tax increases were quite as
important. Individual income, estate, and giftcollections in 1937 were
up some $840 million over 1936; corporation income and related tax
collections were up some $680 million; and the receipts of social security
taxes—which began in 1937—were about $660 million.'2 Moreover,
the Revenue Act of 1936 imposed an undistributed earnings tax on
corporations. And whatever the theoretical merits of undistributed
earnings as a tax base, the 1936 tax seems to have proven administratively
to be very irritating.
In the third quarter of 1937 private domestic demand for gross national
product was at an annual rate of $86.1 billion. By the second quarter of
1938 it had shrunk to $64.2 billion. Of this $21.9 billion decline, the
inventory increment accounted for $8.1 billion, consumer expenditures
for $10.0 billion, and construction and producers' durables for $4.8
billion.'3 In view of the large part played by inventories in the 1937—38
business contraction, and the fact thatwholesale price increases in late
1936 and early 1937 contributed to profits reckoned on a FIFO basis,
wholesale price decreases in late 1937 and early 1938 to FIFO basis losses,
it is reasonable to suppose that the immediate cause of the contraction
was a change in business psychology. And the magnitude of the adverse
10Forthis deficit see Table 5.
In the national income and product accounts the drop is from $3.5 billion to
$186 million. On this basis veterans' benefits, other than life insurance policy benefits,
were $1.9 billion in 1936; on the basis used in Table 5 (which includes the taking up of
adjusted service certificates used as collateral for prior year loans by the United States
Government Life Insurance Fund) they were $2.5 billion. Also 1936 corporation income
and profits tax collections in the Table 5 computation were slightly larger than the
corresponding accruals in the national income and product account computations.
Other factors common to 1935 and 1936 tend to make the Table 5 deficit larger than that
shown in the national income and product accounts in both years.
12TheRevenue Act of 1935 increased tax rates particularly for the upper brackets,
although it did not go as far in taxing large incomes as President Roosevelt had recorr-
mended.
"See Harold Barger, Outlay and Income in the United States 1921—38, Table 11. The
annual rate figures are seasonally adjusted. The inventory increment fell from plus
$5.95 billion to minus $2.13 billion.
110COUNTERCYCLICAL FINANCIAL REQ,UIREMENTS
impulse from federal fiscal policy makes it seem probable that this adverse
impulse touched off the change in psychology.'4
The 1937—38 contraction made many converts to the view that eco-
nomic stabilization should be a major—if not the main—objective of fiscal
policy. And the widespread concern about a possible sharp postwar
recession that prevailed immediately before V-J Day helped the passage
of the Employment Act of 1946. But in February 1946, when the act was
passed, it was clear that the recession was less sharp than the Office of
War Mobilization and Reconversion had predicted, and the language
used was qualified accordingly. Section 2 of the act declares it to be a
federal policy to create and maintain "conditions under which there will
be afforded useful employment opportunities ...forthose able, willing,
and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production,
and purchasing power," this policy to be carried out in a manner con-
sistent with the federal government's "needs and obligations and other
considerations of national policy" and "in a manner calculated to foster
free competitive enterprise and the general welfare," and to be carried
out "with the assistance of industry, agriculture, labor, and state and local
governments." In effect, the act, having declared this policy, left its
implementation largely to subsequent acts of Congress.
If one may draw a firm conclusion from this review of the process by
which a government responsibility for economic stability has been develop-
ing, it would appear to be that a prolonged period of high employment
would be likely to weaken the responsibility, a period of severe unemploy-
ment to push in the other direction. But the trend is toward broadening the
responsibility and making it more categorical.
Itcan be argued that Federal Reserve policy (and Treasury policy in "sterilizing"
gold) helped to start the contraction; cf. Kenneth D. Roose, The Economics of Recession
and Revival, p. 239; "The Federal Reserve action on excess reserves caused short-term
governments to weaken and. .. thereby...theweakening of the securities markets
to which business expectations are very sensitive."
This seems an overstatement of the contractive influence of central banking and
monetary policy. There were still $750 million of excess member bank reserves in August
1937 ($108 million of these in New York City); and the New York Federal Reserve Bank
reduced its rediscount rate from one and one-half to one per cent on August 27. It is
true that member bank borrowings increased during the first nine months of 1937,
particularly in New York City, and that member bank holdings of governments were
reduced from $13.5 billion on December 31, 1936, to $12.7 billion on June 30, 1937,
and to $12.4 billion on December 31 of that year. But member bank loan portfolios were
increased from $13.4 to $14.3 billion during the first six months of 1937 and reporting
member bank loans continued at the June 30 level until the last week in October. Also,
while the open market rate on four to six months commercial paper in New York rose
from the 1936 level of three-fourths per cent to one per cent in March 1937 and continued
at that figure for nearly a year, the rates on ninety day loans and call loans on the Stock
Exchange remained steady from June 1936 to the end of 1938. The tightness in the
money market does not seem to have become serious enough to have been a major
recession-precipitating factor.
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2.TheExperience of the 1930's
Since the idea of countering the cycle as a major federal policy objec-
tive was a new one developed in response to the severe and prolonged
depression of the l930's and one not yet wholeheartedly accepted, there
was naturally a wide variety of measures adopted and programs under-
taken to implement this objective, some more, some less apropos, some
experimented with only to be dropped. Some of the measures and pro-
grams, too, entailed a substantial increase in the federal net debt, others
meant an increase in the gross volume of federal obligations held by the
public but had little or no effect on the net debt, and still others affected
neither the net nor the gross debt significantly.
It will be convenient to consider. the measures adopted and programs
undertaken under the four following heads: (a) those which, though
motivated in some way by the depression, were primarily of a noncyclical
character; (b) those allegedly apropos measures and programs whose
cyclical relevance or effectiveness is open to some question; (c) counter-
cyclical nonfinancial expenditure programs; and (d) apropos measures
and programs primarily of a financial nature.
Let us first simply note the primarily noncyclical measures and
programs. Among these were the Norris-LaGuardia Act; the National
Labor Relations Act; the Chandler amendments to the bankruptcy act;
the holding-company death sentence; most of the provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; the Fair Labor Standards Act (which
can be regarded as about all that survived of the NRA codes); several of
the provisions of the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 ;15theMerchant
Marine Act of 1936; the Old Age and Survivors Insurance system; and
the special public assistance programs (old age assistance, aid to the blind,
and aid to dependent children). Each of these was in some sense a product
of the depression. And no doubt the inauguration of several of them made
contributions to recovery and relief. But they do not constitute significant
continuing measures against a major depression;'6 and, although four
of them—the OASI system and the three public assistance programs—
entail substantial additions to federal nonfinancial expenditures, no part
of the $16 billion debt increase can be attributed to this group of primarily
noncyclical measures and programs. Indeed, were it not for the OASI
system, the net debt increase might have been larger.
Next let us briefly consider three types of measures and programs
15Notablythe prohibition of interest on demand deposits; vesting the control of
interest on time deposits in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
requiring the separation of security affiliates from commercial and savings banks; per-
mitting national banks to engage in branch banking to a limited extent; and a cumulative
voting requirement for national banks.
It can be argued that the OASI system slightly increases the built-in flexibility of
federal fiscal operations.
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whose cyclical relevance or effectiveness is open to some question. None
of these entailed any significant financial requirement.
In our résumé of the development of the view that the federal govern-
ment has a responsibility for promoting full and stable employment and
for relieving the distress caused by business depressions, we noted several
proposed monetary measures that were advocated as means of increasing
prices and employment. Since the effectiveness of these devices is open to
some question, we venture to call them monetary nostrums. More than
one monetary nostrum was tried during the 1930's. The most important
was the devaluation of the dollar, which began with the national bank
holiday of March 6, 1933.17 The Swiss franc rate,18 which had been 19.4
cents in February and March 1933, rose until in February 1934, after
the United States Treasury had fixed the mint price of gold at $35 an
ounce,19 it was 31.7 cents. The major part of this increase took place
before the Warren plan to raise the commodity price level by raising the
price of gold went into operation on October 25, 1933; in September
the franc rate had been 28.7 cents. And while the Bureau of Labor
Statistics wholesale price index rose from 59.8 in February to 71.2 in
October, it dipped slightly in November and December despite increasing
the gold price to $35, and in January when the Warren plan was ter-
minated it had risen only to 72.2.
We will not stop to comment on the other monetary nostrums that were
tried during the 1930's.2° Devaluation was not only a monetary device, but
a part of a quite general reaction to the severe prolonged depression, a
reaction in the direction of autarchy and economic nationalism.2' The
other main steps taken in this direction by the United States were the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act (1930),. and the authorizations to the
President under the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act to impose quotas and additional duties. Because
autarchic moves were quite general they were not very effective counter-
cyclically. Two major steps that contributed to a reversal of the direction
of the external economic policies of the United States were the Trade
Agreements Act (1934), and the Tripartite Accord (September 25, 1936)
entered into by Great Britain, France, and the United States to stabilize
exchange rates.
"Mostof the commercial banks in the country had already been closed at this
date through state "holidays."
18TheSwiss franc is used here since it was one of the currencies that was not devalued
until after 1934.
19Underthe provisions of the Gold Reserve Act, January 31, 1934. This represented
almost a 70 per cent increase over the preholiday price.
20Thesilver purchase program and several attempts to legislate an increase in the
quantity of paper money.
So was the silver purchase program, for it discriminated in favor of domestic
production.
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Another type of measure that it seems fair to characterize as allegedly
but not clearly a very effective part of an antidepression program was the
competition-restricting industry code. Such codes were adopted under
the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), and, in the
case of some industries, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933).
Possibly they had some part in checking the downward price and wage
spiral, and it has been suggested that efforts to make purchases before
the codes took effect, many of them in the late summer and the fall of 1933,
contributed to business revival.22 But their contribution to recovery does
not seem to have been a major one, and they were terminated by a
decision of the Supreme Court.23
So much for the measures of questionable cyclical relevance. Next as
to the nonfinancial countercyclical expenditure programs. This type of
policy during the 1930's was a distinctly vacillating one. Even under the
Democratic administration there continued to be two strongly opposed
schools of thought, the budget-balancing school and the fiscal countercycle
school. As a result the countercyclical stimulus was interrupted in 1935
and again more markedly in 1937. Further, much of the time while an
expanded expenditure stimulus was being applied with one hand, the
other hand was simultaneously effecting expenditure cuts. This inevitably
made it necessary to draw a sharp legal line between expenditures on
functions subject to the cuts (the "normal functions") and emergency
expenditures for recovery and relief, so that no made-work project could
be approved and allocated funds to perform a normal function.24
Despite their vacillating nature such emergency expenditures were
undoubtedly of substantial importance. They served both to provide
relief by contributing to disposable personal income and to aid recovery
by augmenting aggregate demand. Table 32 summarizes the program
expenditures that helped to provide relief. Since the level of such ex-
penditures was substantially higher during the second half of the decade
of the 1930's a separate column is devoted to the averages for these five
years. But even in the l935.—39 column the ratio of line F to the $16.8
decrease shown on line G is only about I to 5; the corresponding ratio for
the decade is1 to 10.3. However, the purchasing power.of the consumer's
dollar averaged nearly 20 per cent above the 1929 level during the 1930's,
22Thedeclines in prices, wages, and production were checked before any code
went into effect. The Federal Reserve index of industrial production (seasonally adjusted)
rose from 59 in March to 100 in July, then fluctuated between 71 and 91 for more than
a year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics index of wholesale prices of nonfarm, nonfood
commodities started a sharp upward movement in May; average hourly earnings of
manufacturing employees did likewise in July.
Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (June 1935).
But there is a presumption that the normal functions subject to the expenditure




Federal Countercyclical Programs Related to Personal Income and
Farm Income, 1929—39





A.Federal direct relief 0 10 21
B.Public assistance grants-in-aid 8 412a 617
C.Unemployment compensation benefits 0 83 166
D.Work relief payrolls 0 953 1,682
E.Veterans' pensions, etc.b 536 766 776
F.Total above 544 2,224 3,262
G.Disposable personal income 83,120 61,628 66,336
H.Government payments to farmers 0 309 573
J.Federal Farm Board loan losses 0 35 0
K.Net cash income to persons on farms
from farming 4,304 2,711 3,293
a Includes$280 million of RFC loans to states, 1923—33, which were later forgiven,
grants for vocational education and rehabilitation, for maternal and child health and
welfare, for old age assistance, for aid to dependent children, and for aid to the blind, and
FERA grants for general relief.
bPension,disability, and retirement payments and adjusted compensation benefits.
SouRcE: See Appendix A.
and a fair comparison of relief expenditure to income decline should take
account of this fact. A fair comparison, too, should take account of the
growth of population. The following computation makes a rough allow-
ance both for price changes and for population growth:
1930—39 1935—39
Average Average
a,Consumer expenditure price indexa 80.4 79.7
b.Population (in 126.9 129.0
c.Line G/(line a >< line b) $603C $644"
d.(Line G —lineF)/(line a x line b) $58 10 $612e
Indexin Table 41, 1954National Income Supplement tothe Surveyof Current Business,
converted to a 1929 base.
bContinentalUnited States.
C1929dollars.
Per capita disposable income in 1929 was $682. Line c indicates that for
the following decade it averaged the equivalent of 603 1929 dollars, and
that during 1935—39 it averaged the equivalent of 644 of these dollars, or
about 5.6 per cent below the 1929 level. Without the transfer payment
(and work relief) items summarized on line F of Table 32, per capita
disposable income would have been $677 in 1929, 581 1929 dollars per
year during 1930—39; and 612 1929 dollars per year during 1935—39 or
9.6 per cent below the 1929 level. The transfer (and work relief) items
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seem to have been large enough in 1935—39 to offset about half the average
per capita income The 1935—39 level of per capita farm income,
corrected for price changes, was about 4 per cent below that of 1929.
Without government transfer payments it might have been something like
20 per cent down from the 1929 level.
TABLE 33






A.Work relief payrolls . 0 953 1,682
B.New constructiona 155 414 511
C.Purchases of silverb 0 28 43
D.Other federal GNP expenditures 1,156 1,823 2,312
E.Non-public-assistance grants-in-aid 109 355 375
F.Total above 1,420 3,575 4,923
G.Total GNP expenditures 104,436 76,913 84,469
a Excludesrelief work construction.
b Domestic only.
SOURCE: See Appendix A.
The WPA and other work relief programs—Civilian Conservation
Corps, Civil Works Administration, and National Youth Administration
—accounted for a very substantial part of the relief expenditures shown in
Table 32. They also accounted for a substantial part of federal demand for
GNP. Table 33 relates the components of this demand, and federal grants-
in-aid that added to state and local demand for GNP in 1930—39, to 1929
levels. Line F in Table 33 may be taken as a rough measure of the total
direct federal contribution to aggregate demand. There is no very satis-
factory way of appraising quantitatively the significance of line F for
recovery. However, we may note that the average annual contribution to
aggregate demand in 1930—34 was $2.2 billion; average GNP was $69.4
25Thiscomparison of declines with and without the expenditure programs takes no
account of any possible "multiplier effect." Nor does the farm incomes comparison that
follows.
Corresponding computations for farm income are as follows:
1929 1930—391935—39
Average Average
a. Price indexa 100 77.5 77.5
b. Population (in millions) 30.2 31.1 30.9
c. Line K/(line a x line b) $142.5 $112" $137"
d. (Line K —lineH —lineJ)/(lineax lineb)$142.5 $98.2" $113"
Pricespaid by farmers for family l.iving expense Historical sties, E-99,
converted to a 1929 base.
"1929dollars.
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billion. Thus from 1930—34 to 1935—39 the annual level of the GNP in-
creased by $15.1 billion, and the increment in the direct federal contribu-
tion accounted for $2.7 billion or roughly 18 per cent of this increase.
It remains to consider recovery, relief, and economic stabilization
measures and programs of a financial nature. Three general types may be
distinguished: (a) central banking measures, (b) private credit under-
writing measures, and (c) direct federal lending. Only in the case of the
third type is a substantial financial requirement involved, and this
requirement relates to gross rather than net debt. During the decade of the
l930's the federal loan portfolio increased by $9 billion.26
The principal central banking measures adopted during the l930's
were as follows: giving the Board of Governorsthe Federal Reserve
System limited discretionary power to vary member bank reserve re-
quirements; giving this Board discretionary power to vary margin re-
quirements for margin trading on the stock exchanges; and giving the
System's Open Market Committee power to regulate Federal Reserve
Bank open market operations. There is no reason to suppose these measures
contributed anything significant to the objective of recovery, still less to
that of relief. Rather what they did provide was the basis for a strengthened
countercyclical central bank credit policy whose effectiveness was mainly
pertinent to other stages of the cycle.
The principal federal credit underwriting programs inaugurated
during the 1930's were: insurance of demand and time deposits in most
commercial banks and mutual savings banks; insurance of most of the
purchasable shares (and credited earnings) of savings and loan associa-
tions; insurance of important types of home mortgage loans and loans to
finance home repairs and improvements. If in this connection we stretch
the subject of the chapter, we may add to the list the more recent pro-
grams of the Veterans' Administration for guaranteeing loans to veterans
for purchase or construction of homes and purchase of farms or business
property.
Since 1950 deposit insurance has covered deposits up to $10,000. As of
the end of 1954 there were $212 billion demand and time deposits in banks
in the United States; 53 per cent of these were insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. At this time also the private savings
capital of all savings and loan associations in the United States totaled
$27.3 billion; of this amount practically 90 per cent was invested in
institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion. The extent of other government underwriting programs for private
credit is shown in Table 34.
26SeeTable 35. The spread between gross and net debt is affected by other factors
as well as the loan portfolio, particularly the balance in the general fund and federal
obligations held by federal agencies.
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The FDIC began operating in 1934, probably not soon enough to
have contributed significantly to the restoration of confidence in the
nation's banking system that followed the bank holiday. The Federal
Housing Administration loan insurance programs may well have done
something to augment the volume of residential construction in the later
1930's.27 Also, in the future FHA terms may be adjusted from time to
TABLE 34
Loans Guaranteed or Insured by Federal Agencies, 1939 and 1954
December 31, June 30,
1939 1954
UNDERWRIrFENLOANSOUTSTANDING
A.Housing and home loans
(billions of' dollars)
2.14 37.6
B.Farm credit 0.0 2.2
C.Other loans 0.5 0.9
D.Total federally underwritten loans 2.6 40.7
RATIO OF tJNDER.WRITrENLOANSTO ALL OUTSTANDINGS
(per cent)
E.Mortgages on 1- to 4-family norifarm
residential properties 11 42
F.Farm credit 0 13
SOURCE: See Appendix A.
time so as to provide a countercyclical credit policy.28 But the principal
countercyclical significance of all these credit underwriting programs
surely is not in providing relief from a depression or in promoting re-
covery. Rather it is that they serve to strengthen important parts of the
economy's financial structure, so that these parts will not again acceler-
ate a downswing as they did during 1929—33.
In discussing, federal lending programs it will be convenient to stretch
the subject of this chapter somewhat further, considering not only those
inaugurated during the 1930's but also those started earlier and those
started since.
Although with negligible exceptions state and local governments had
long before that ceased to engage in credit operations, prior to World
War I there had been no direct federal activities in the credit field since
the Second Bank of the United States. A major credit program was initiated
27 Cf. Leo Grebler, David Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential
Real Estate, pp. 148—49.
28Thehome mortgage insurance system established under the National Housing Act
(1934), was designed to operate with countercyclical variations in insurance premium
rates. And provisions for varying down payments and amortization periods have since
been added. But there is no real provision for the cyclical coordination of FHA policies
with those of the Federal Reserve, or of Administration policies with either.
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by the Federal Farm Loan Act (1916), which provided for the organization
of federal and joint-stock land banks. Then when the United States entered
the war it promptly began to help finance the war activities of its allies by
extending them loans, though viewed in retrospect these loans are better
TABLE 35










A.Farm credit 350a 1,296 3,620 6,811
B.Housing loans 0 0 2,540 2,930
C.Obligations of financial
institutions Ob 0 1,185 985
D.State and local govern-
ment obligations 0 0 455 645
E.Railroad obligations 445b 60 500 79
F.Life insurance funds
loans to veterans 0 270 152 208°
G.Investments in IMF, IBRD,
and Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund 0 0 2,000 3,585
H.Recent loans to foreign
governments 0 0 0 1
119b 80 248 1,070
K.Total above 914 1,706 10,700 28,196
L.World War I obligations
of foreign governments 10,092 11,532 e 12,661 e I 2,553r
a December31.
bLineJ reports War Finance Corporation loans as of November 15, 1920. About
one-half of the $119 million were loans to railroads, and about one-third were loans to
banks and exporters to finance agricultural and other exports. ByJune 30, 1921, railroad
obligations as reported in line E had increased to $680 million.
CLifeinsurance policy loans only.
dIncludesloans made by the Export-Import Bank and RFC prior to V-J Day.
eExcludesaccrued interest.
As of June 30, 1954, excludes accrued interest, but includes $91.5 million debt of
Federal Republic of Germany under agreement of February 27, 1953.
SOURCE: See Appendix A.
called grants. And by the Act of April 5, 1918, the War Finance Corpora-
tion was established. While it was initially expected the WFC would lend
chiefly to banks, the corporation made direct industrial loans, and after
the war and before the establishment of federal intermediate credit banks
under the Agricultural Credits Act (1923), it was for a time primarily
an agricultural credit agency.
On June 30, 1920, the loans and securities held by the federal govern-
ment and its agencies included the foreign government obligations, the
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portfolios of the WFC and the land banks, loans extended to railroads
during federal control and in connection with their return to private
and securities acquired in exchange for war surplus properties
(see Table 35). During the 1920's farm credit increased by some 270 per
cent, and a new type of credit appeared, loans to veterans by the United
States Life Insurance Fund. The other portfolio items, being war-con-
nected, declined.
If we do not count Federal Farm Board loans, the expansion of federal
credit activities during the 1930's began with the establishment of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation by the Act of January 22, 1932, of
twelve Regional Agricultural Credit Corporations under the Emergency
Relief and Construction Act (1932), and of twelve federal home loan banks
under the Act ofJuly 22, 1932. We have noted that the original idea that
the RFC should make only fully and adequately secured loans was shortly
modified, could be done at the time to promote business recovery
by extending loans on a strictly commercial basis was extremely limited.
At the end of February 1933 the home loan banks (which were still
operating on this basis) held only $9 million of home mortgages. However,
during the three years ending December 31, 1932, federal credit more than
doubled. Then during 1933 it increased by $1.2 billion and during 1934
by $4.1 billion.29 A major part of this expansion reflected the temporary
substitution of federal for private credit at strategic points in order to
bolster up the whole credit structure of the economy. And striking as these
figures are, they do not include what was by far the largest and most
important operation of this sort, the very temporary substitution of the
29Creditfigures for these three year-ends are as follows:
12/31/3212/31/3312/31/34
A. Loans and preferred stock held by
government corporations and credit
agencies, n.e.c. 3,192 4,174 8,202
B. Loans held by U.S. Life Insurance Fund 477 529 561
C. State and local government securities
held by federal agencies 14 90 250
D. Total credit above 3,683 4,793 9,013
On line A see R. J. Saulnier, Harold G. Haicrow, and Neil H. Jacoby, Federal Lending
and Loan Insurance, Tables A-i, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-8, and A-b. Line A of the above table
includes loans by Federal Land Banks, banks for cooperatives, intermediate credit banks,
and Federal Home Loan Banks. It excludes Veterans' Administration loans and loans
to state and local governments that are components of the Table A-i total and loans by
Federal Reserve Banks shown in Table A-5. On line B of the above table, see Admini-
strator of Veterans' Affairs, 1935 Annual Report, p. 90. On line C see Secretary of the
Treasury, 1945 Annual Report, p. 697 (average of two June 30 figures).
Lines B and C have the effect of adjusting the definition of total federal credit (line D)
to suit our present purpose. The line B adjustment makes it inclusive of Adjusted Service
Certificate loans; the line C adjustment excludes the $300 million RFC loans to states
that subsequently became grants-in-aid.
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government's credit for that of all the banks of the country in 1933 during
the brief interval following the holiday in which they were in process of
being reopened. But the figures do include two large-scale credit sub-
stitutions, the taking over of distress home and farm mortgages at a loss
by two corporations organized especially for the purpose, the Home
Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation.
Smaller in volume but at least of equal strategic importance were the
loans to banks by the RFC and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion and the acquisitions of bank preferred stock and the loans to other
financial institutions by the RFC.
In addition to this temporary distress refinancing, federal credit was
expanded during the 1930's to finance purchases of new national product.
Thus there were emergency loans by the Public Works Administration
and, especially after 1937, loans by a number of corporations and agencies
organized to promote particular programs.3°
During World War II federal credit at first increased, then markedly
declined. Other sectors of our economy, having substantial cash surpluses
after 1941, paid off debts and added to their holdings of cash, governments,
and private securities. Also, after the passage of 'the Lend-Lease Act,
March 11, 1941, financial assistance was extended to allied governments
by purchasing goods for them—the nature of the obligations involved not
being definitely fixed at the time—rather than through loans as in World
War I.
By June 30, 1945, federal loans to foreign governments, other than the
World War I obligations on line L of Table 35, totaled only about $800
million. Thus there has been an expansion of over $1 1 billion in such loans
since that date and up to the end of Most of the rest of the increase
in external federal credit after V-J Day reflects capital subscriptions to two
international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. How-
ever, a substantial part of the IMF subscription, $1.8 billion, was provided
by reducing investment in the Exchange Stabilization Fund, the main
function of which—to discharge American obligations under the Tripar-
tite Accord of 1936—in effect passed on to the IMF.
The increases in internal credit from V-J Day to the end of 1953 were
small by comparison. The chief expansions were in loans to finance farms
and homes (including veterans' homes and farms) and in other loans to
veterans.
30Thefollowing list of lending agencies will serve to indicate the variety of programs
so promoted: Rural Electrification Administration, Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion, United States Housing Authority, Electric Home and Farm Authority, Farm Security
Administration, Commodity Credit Corporation, Export-Import Bank, RFC Mortgage
Corporation, United States Maritime Commission.
31SeeChapter VIII For a comparison between loans and grants during this period.
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On the basis of the above examination of the experience of the 1930's
it may be in order to speculate briefly on some of the developments that
might take place if perchance our economy were again to undergo a severe
recession and depression lasting, say, as long as three years.
If the depression were sufficiently severe, it might well be the occasion
for adopting various measures and programs that were not cyclically
particularly relevant. And there would probably be allegedly pertinent
measures and programs whose actual effectiveness was small, among them
one or more monetary nostrums. Again the process of recession would be
likely to disclose additional weak parts of our economy's credit structure,
with the result that measures would be adopted to strengthen these parts.
Also steps might be taken toward a stronger, better coordinated counter-
cyclical credit policy, and other countercyclical measures of a regulatory
nature might be adopted. Quite possibly none of these developments
would involve any extra net financial requirement; none would be likely
to except perhaps some cyclically irrelevant measure or program.
If the process of recession disclosed additional weak spots in our credit
structure, there might again be need for large-scale substitutions of federal
for private credit. And in any case large federal lending programs might be
inaugurated to finance and to encourage expanded purchases of our
national product. It would be strange indeed, with the growth of our
economy since the 1930's, the extent to which the federal government has
come to be involved in making loans, and the higher level of prices pre-
vailing in recent years,32 if depression lending did not lead to a step-up of
gross in relation to net debt of a number of times $9 billion.
in general the measures that contribute most to dealing with a severe
depression, once there has been a sufficient business contraction to involve
one, are measures that require to be financed either in the grosser sense of
borrowing to finance lending or in the net sense of financing increased
GNP expenditures, state and local grants-in-aid, and transfer payments to
individuals.33 Should there be another severe depression, it is reasonable to
suppose that there would be a fuller and more general recognition of
federal responsibility for promoting recovery and providing relief and that
the balance-the-budget-during-depression school of thought would have
• somewhat less of a following, so that expenditure programs would get
under way less tardily and be maintained more consistently, and so that
they would be larger relative to the size of the economy and to the degree
of business contraction. One might expect too, that federal taxes would
The implicit deflator of the GNP for 1954 is 71 per cent above that for 1929.
It could be argued that it would theoretically be possible to stimulate recovery
and relieve distress without incurring a deficit, provided there is a sufficiently large
expansion of nonfinancial expenditures and receipts. But it will probably be conceded
that the expansion would have to be so large as to make such a government budget
most unlikely.
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not be stepped up as they were during the 1930's; rather yields would
decrease and rates might be reduced. Possibly too there would be experi-
mentation with incentive tax concessions or subsidies to encourage in-
creases in private components of aggregate demand. These considerations
—and the higher level of prices—suggest that, if our economy were again
to undergo a marked recession and depression, even though it were shorter
and far less severe than was the case in the 1930's, net borrowing to the
extent of quite a number of times $16 billion might easily be entailed.
These speculations regarding possible developments in the event of
another marked business contraction imply a premise that should be made
explicit. We assume that the changes in the economy of the United States
and of the world that have come about since 1929—both planned and
unplanned—do not preclude such a contraction. It would mean somewhat
of a digression to argue that this is so; hence it is merely stated as a premise.
One who rejects the premise will of course reject the speculations too.
3. Ivfore Recent Minor Recession Experiences
Of the four main types of measures and programs distinguished in the
preceding section there is one we certainly need not consider in connection
with minor recessions: new programs that are primarily of a noncyclical
character. Nor is there much reason to expect a minor recession in the
United States to stimulate recourse to monetary nostrums, general com-
petition-restricting arrangements, or autarchic measures under present
conditions.34 But what isoften called monetary policy—accurately
speaking, what is usually meant is mostly central bank credit policy—was
an important part of federal policy toward the 1953—54 recession. And if
definite countercyclical movements in Federal Reserve rediscount rates,
the volume of Federal Reserve credit outstanding, member bank reserve
requirements, and margin requirements did not characterize the twelve
months following V-J Day, and if rediscount rates were maintained and
Federal Reserve credit was contracted during the 1949 recession, there
were special postwar circumstances to explain these facts.35
Table 36 summarizes the main other phases of federal policy and
federal operations pertinent to recent recessions, except for policies and
operations relating to agriculture. During 1945—46, despite the drop in
distributive share receipts, disposable income was maintained chiefly as a
result of increases in veterans' and unemployment compensation benefit
payments. And with the decrease in corporate profits tax accruals, profits
after tax averaged about the same in the first half of 1946 as in the second
Of course the 1949 recession did precipitate devaluation of the pound sterling and
various other currencies.
Rediscount rates were raised in April—May 1946. There were reductions in member
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































quarter of 1945. Government credit and government underwritten credit
were not important cyclical influences in this period.
During the 1949 recession the annual rate of distributive share receipts
decreased by about $9 billion. Roughly half of this decrease was offset by
the three fiscal influences identified on lines B, C, and D. And of the
cyclical decrease of over $9 billion in the annual rate of corporate profits
(before tax) the tax accrual decrease absorbed about one-third. There
were minor increases during this recession in government credit and
government underwritten credit. The nonfinancial surplus of the federal
government dropped from $9.9 billion in 1948 to $0.5 billion in 1949.
Between the second quarter of 1953 and the second quarter Of 1954
distributive share receipts declined only slightly. The decrease in personal
taxes during this interval and the increases in unemployment compensa-
tion benefits and miscellaneous federal transfer payments were sufficient to
boost the annual rate of disposable income by some $5 billion. The annual
rate for corporate profits after tax declined nearly 16 per cent despite the
sharp cut in profits tax accruals. There was a small increase in federal
credit, a significant increase in government underwritten loans.
LineJ indicates a substantial increase in federal financial requirements
between the second quarter of 1953 and that of 1954. But there must have
been other developments that helped to offset those shown in the table.
The federal nonfinancial deficit for the year ending June 30, 1954, was
only $1.5 billion; the deficit for the third quarter of 1954 was only $0.5
billion above that a year earlier.36
It is convenient to deal separately with the federal policies and opera-
tions affecting agriculture because it seems desirable to use annual data
to portray them and because the year-to-year changes are not purely
cyclical (see Table 37). Net income of farm operators dropped sharply
from the 1948 level during 1949, recovered somewhat during 1950—51,
and then contracted during the three years 1952—54. Three fiscal influences
on net operator income are identified in the table: government payments,
the increment in inventories and the loan portfolio of the Commodity
Credit Corporation, and property taxes. Although these taxes are levied
by state and local governments, especially the latter, it seems wise to
36Thesefigures are derived from the quarterly federal sources and uses statement,
1953—55, compiled as a part of the National Bureau's study of Postwar Capital Markets.
An annual figure and a year-ago comparison are given here because there is a marked
seasonal variation in the federal nonfinancial deficit for which no seasonal adjustment
is yet available.
Quite possibly some part of the $2 billion financial requirement indicated by these
figures is due to factors other than the 1953—54 recession. While the nonfinancial trans-
actions account was in balance for calendar 1952, if due allowance could be made for
seasonal variation, it might show a deficit even before the recession began. The adjusted
National Income and Product Account for the federal government does show one for





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































include them in the table, because they have often been cyclically per-
verse. The combined fiscal influence reflected in line F made some con-
tribution to net operator income in 1949, and a substantial one in
1953.
The significance of the fiscal operations covered by the two tables for
federal capital requirements can perhaps be best appraised in terms of the
increments shown. The maximum cyclical increments in the annual rates
on line J of Table 36 are: for 1945—46, $18.4 billion; for 1948—49, $6.5
billion; for 1953—54, $13.9 billion. In Table 37 line D increases by $1.11
billion from 1947 to 1949 and by $3.25 billion from 1951 to 1953.
These figures suggest that even a minor recession might easily entail
net borrowing of the order of magnitude of $16 billion, if at the outset
nonfinancial receipts did not exceed nonfinancial expenditures. Particu-
larly is this so in view of the possibility that federal fiscal operations in time
may well become somewhat more markedly flexible countercyclically not
only in a built-in but also in a managed sense than in the three postwar
recessions we have been considering. And while conceivably the federal
government might at the outset of a recession be enjoying a substantial
nonfinancial surplus, as in 1948 (see Table 5), we should note also that
the cash surpluses of the social insurance funds may be smaller in the
future than they were during the 1940's.
Assuming net borrowing during a business contraction, either major
or minor, the question arises, Is the resulting additional net debt likely
to be paid off when the depression is over? Some attention is given to this
question in Chapter VIII.
4. Summary
Responsibility for seeing that the economy operates at a somewhat
stable, high employment level seems to have been becoming a recognized
function of the federal government. Recognition of this function has
tended to grow during periods of depressed business; interest in it to
weaken during periods of prolonged prosperity.
The great depression of, the 1930's stimulated the federal government
to take a wide variety of steps. Among these were measures and programs
that, though in some sense motivated by the depression, were definitely
not primarily countercyclical in e.g. the National Labor Relations
Act and the Old Age and Survivors Insurance System. There were also
measures of alleged but questionable pertinence or effectiveness, monetary
nostrums, autarchic measures, and the NRA and AAA competition-
restricting codes. And there were measures and programs that clearly
served the objective of recovery and relief: expenditure programs to
bolster personal and farm income and aggregate demand and lending
and loan underwriting programs, some aimed at relieving financial dis-
tress, others at increasing the private components of aggregate demand,
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still others like and savings insurance at strengthening the economy's
financial structure.
Before the 1930's relief programs were quite generally regarded as
functions of private charity and of local government; and federal counter-
cyclical responsibilities were for the most part confined to those exercised
by the Federal Reserve System. During the 1930's the Federal Reserve's
countercyclical powers were strengthened through new controls of margin
trading requirements and member bank reserve requirements and through
statutory recognition of the Open Market Committeee. The great 1929—33
recession also brought recognition of a new federal function, responsibility
for recovery and relief. And the 1937—38 recession pushed this function
in a more forward-looking direction, a responsibility for maintaining a
high and stable level of employment.
Were we to experience another severe, long-continued business
depression, a number of the developments of the 1930's might be more or
less closely paralleled. The response might well include various measures
and the inauguration of various programs of essentially an irrelevant
nature as allegedly relevant ones that did not contribute much
to recovery and relief. Of course it would encourage relevant measures
and programs too. We might expect a strengthening of central bank
countercyclical influences and development of other forms of counter-
cyclical influence. Also we might expect new weak spots in our credit
structure to be revealed, and anticipate that measures would be adopted
to remedy them. And there might easily be federal credit extension pro-
grams both to relieve financial distress and to promote recovery—pro-
grams that would entail an increase in the federal loan portfolio of far
more than $9 billion. Likewise there might easily be expenditure programs
—for purchases of GNP, for grants-in-aid, for subsidies, and for transfer
payments to individuals—which, together with tax decreases, would
mean an increase in net federal debt of many times more than $16 billion.
In the minor recessions since World War II there have been substan-
tial countercyclical variations in federal nonfinancial receipts and ex-
penditures—to a considerable extent built-in variations. And while
there were special postwar circumstances that precluded this development
in the 1945 and 1949 recessions, during 1953—54 countercyclical Federal
Reserve policy—along with other credit measures—was a principal
reliance. In future, countercyclical fiscal operations may well be on a
larger scale than they were during the postwar decade. In any case from
that experience it is clear that even a minor recession could easily entail
a net debt increase as large as the increase incurred during the 1930's,
particularly if at the start of the recession federal nonfinancial expendi-
tures were as large as nonfinancial receipts.
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